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I examine changes in the city-suburban housing price gap in metropolitan areas with and without court-ordered
desegregation plans over the 1970s, narrowing my comparison to housing units on opposite sides of
district boundaries. The desegregation of public schools in central cities reduced the demand for urban
residence, leading urban housing prices and rents to decline by six percent relative to neighboring
suburbs. The aversion to integration was due both to changes in peer composition and to student reassignment
to non-neighborhood schools. The associated reduction in the urban tax base imposed a fiscal externality
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The  desegregation  of  public  schools  outside  of  the  South  fundamentally  changed  the 
bundle of public goods available to many central city residents. Before desegregation, the typical 
white student attended a local public school with predominately white peers. In the early 1970s, 
the Supreme Court ruled that non-southern school districts could be obligated to redress de facto 
racial segregation arising from historical patterns of residential location. As a result, students in 
some urban districts were exposed to cross-race peers for the first time, often by being reassigned 
to a school outside of their immediate neighborhood. 
Previous  work  demonstrates  that  school  desegregation  led  to  improvements  in 
educational  outcomes  for  black  students.
1  However,  as  this  paper  shows,  court-ordered 
desegregation also generated considerable costs for central cities and their residents. Following 
the  implementation  of  desegregation  plans,  white  enrollment  in  urban  schools  fell  as  some 
households relocated to the suburbs and others opted for private schooling (Reber, 2005; Baum-
Snow and Lutz, 2008). I show that this reduction in demand for urban living resulted in a six 
percent decline in urban housing prices and rents relative to neighboring suburbs. The associated 
reduction in the urban tax base imposed a fiscal externality on the remaining residents of central 
cities. Although the federal government provided some monetary support for the direct cost of 
desegregation through the Emergency School Aid Act, these funds were not sufficient to fully 
compensate for the costs of the program, both psychic and real. 
Housing  prices  offer  the  possibility  of  estimating  a  precise  metric  of  the  marginal 
resident’s  willingness  to  pay  to  avoid  school  desegregation.  In  comparing  the  effect  of 
                                                 
1 Guryan (2004) and Ashenfelter, Collins and Yoon (2006) document that cohorts of black students who attended 
high school after the implementation of desegregation plans have somewhat lower dropout rates and higher earnings 
later in life. Reber (forthcoming) demonstrates that, at least in the South, the net effect of desegregation on black 




desegregation on housing prices to related hedonic estimates in the literature, I conclude that the 
advent of racially integrated classrooms and any potentially associated effect on peer quality can 
explain  around  two-thirds  of  the  aversion  to  desegregation  plans  (Kane,  Riegg  and  Staiger, 
2006).
2 The remainder can be attributed to the fact that desegregation plans often required some 
children  to  be  assigned  to  schools  outside  of  their  immediate  neighborhood  (Bogart  and 
Cromwell, 2000).  
Housing  price  estimates  also  allow  for  a  comparison  of  the  responses  to  school 
desegregation  in  southern  and  non-southern  areas.  Many  southern  school  districts  were 
encouraged  to  desegregate  through  financial  incentives  embedded  in  Title  I  of  the  1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Cascio, et al. (2010) show that the average southern 
district required $1000 (in 2000 dollars) of federal funding per pupil per year to move beyond 
token levels of desegregation. After converting my housing price estimate into equivalent units, 
it appears that the marginal resident of a non-southern city was up to four times less resistant to 
desegregation  than  was  the  median  southern  voter.  Studying  the  behavior  of  these  “typical” 
residents allows the history of desegregation to move beyond case studies that overemphasize the 
most vocal and organized members of society. 
This paper focuses on 81 city-suburban school district pairs outside of the South, 29 of 
which were placed under court order to desegregate in the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, case 
law focused on the officially-sanctioned (de jure) separation of schools by race in the South.
3 In 
the 1973 Keyes v. Denver decision, the Supreme Court ruled that districts were also responsible 
                                                 
2 Angrist and Lang (2004) find no evidence of negative peer effects on existing students in school districts that 
accept minorities as part of Boston area’s voluntary METCO busing program, despite the fact that the average 
METCO student has lower test scores than the average in the receiving districts. See also Hoxby and Weingarth 
(2005). 
3 50 percent of large southern districts that desegregated through the courts received their court order in 1970 or 




for addressing de facto school segregation arising from factors like residential patterns. However, 
despite the fact that a large fraction of residential segregation takes place between cities and 
suburbs, the Court declared that desegregation remedies could not extend across district lines 
(Miliken v. Bradley, 1974). Because suburban districts had few, if any, black residents, suburbs 
were  often  not  considered  to  be  segregated  and  thus  were  not  required  to  participate  in 
desegregation activity. 
Motivated by this legal history, my research design takes the form of a difference-in-
differences estimation. The first difference considers the change in the city-suburban housing 
price  gap  over  the  1970s  in  metropolitan  areas  whose  central  city  faced  mandatory 
desegregation.  In  these  areas,  neither  the  city  nor  the  suburb  were  under  court  order  to 
desegregate in 1970, while the city fell under court order to desegregate by 1980. The second 
difference  incorporates  city-suburban  pairs  in  which  neither  the  city  nor  the  suburb  (or, 
alternatively,  both  districts)  underwent  desegregation  during  the  period.  This  comparison 
accounts for national trends that may have reduced the demand for urban residence over the 
1970s, including the suburbanization of employment opportunities or fiscal mismanagement in 
central cities. Reassuringly, I do not find a differential trend in the city-suburban housing price 
gap between treatment and control borders in the previous decade (1960 to 1970). 
In  the  ideal  experiment,  the  city-suburban  housing  price  gap  would  be  measured  by 
comparing housing units that are identical in all respects except for their location. However, in 
reality, city and suburban housing differ in many ways including age of the unit, lot size, and so 
on. I approximate the experiment of interest by comparing neighboring housing units on opposite 




to study the willingness to pay for school quality.
4 The estimated price response to desegregation 
is twice as large in the district as a whole, suggesting that a focus on the border area may control 
for important omitted variables. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  introduces  the 
estimation equation that relates housing prices to the presence of a desegregation order. Section 
III  describes  a  unique  data  set  combining  Census  blocks  along  school  district  borders  with 
information on the timing and content of desegregation plans. In section IV, I present the main 
effect  of  desegregation  on  housing  prices  and  rents,  while  Section  V  considers  alternative 
specifications.  Section  VI  interprets  the  estimates  in  the  context  of  the  history  of  school 
desegregation. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Estimation Strategy 
The goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of court-ordered school desegregation on 
housing prices in a school district. If the marginal homebuyer has a distaste for integration, I 
expect that housing prices in urban districts that were required to desegregate will be lower than 
in their neighboring suburbs. I estimate the effect of school desegregation on housing prices by 
exploiting variation across metropolitan areas and over time. First, I evaluate changes in the city-
suburban price gap between 1970 and 1980 in metropolitan areas anchored by a central city that 
faced  mandatory  desegregation.  Then,  I  consider  borders  in  which  neither  the  city  nor  the 
suburban district (or, in some cases, both districts) underwent court-ordered desegregation over 
this  period.  Finally,  my  difference-in-differences  specification  compares  changes  in  the  city-
                                                 
4 This border discontinuity method was pioneered by Black (1999), who studied the willingness to pay for school 
quality across school catchment area boundaries. See also Kane, Staiger and Samms (2003) and Figlio and Lucas 
(2004). Boustan (2007) compares housing prices across city-suburban boundaries to study the willingness to pay to 




suburban housing price gap over the 1970s in metropolitan areas that were subject to court-
ordered desegregation and those that were not. 
I begin with the sub-sample of metropolitan areas whose central city were required to 
desegregate in the 1970s. Pooling data from 1970 and 1980, I estimate: 
 
ln(PRICE)isbt =  βPLAN(CITY x T) + S + T + (B x T) + εisbt              (1) 
where PRICE indicates the mean value of owner-occupied housing units on block i at time t.
5 
My preferred specification limits attention to blocks on either side of school district boundaries 
in order to minimize differences in housing quality between the city and suburban housing units.   
Equation 1 groups neighboring school districts into border areas, each containing one 
central  city  and  one  adjacent  suburb.  Border  area  fixed  effects  (B)  absorb  neighborhood 
attributes that are shared by houses on either side of the border such as the presence of a nearby 
park, a bus line, or a commercial strip. The interaction between border area dummy variables and 
the  1980  Census  year  (B  x  T)  allows  this  common  effect  to  change  as  the  neighborhood 
gentrifies  or  deteriorates  over  time.  The  regression  is  fully  saturated  by  adding  separate 
indicators for the city and suburban side of each border (S). These side of the border fixed effects 
capture long-standing differences in school quality or housing attributes across borders.
6  
The variable of interest is the interaction between CITY, an indicator for blocks on the 
city  side  of  the  border,  and  the  1980  Census  year.  In  this  sub-sample,  all  city  blocks  were 
exposed to desegregation over the 1970s. The coefficient βPLAN identifies how the difference in 
                                                 
5 Housing price (rent) regressions are weighted by the number of owner-occupied (rental) housing units on the 
block. 
6 Some school districts contribute observations to two or more border areas in the sample. For example, the north 
side of Chicago adjacent to Evanston, IL is part of one border area, while the west side of Chicago next to Oak Park, 
IL forms another border. Side of the border fixed effects are more flexible than school district effects, allowing for 




housing  prices  between  the  city  and  suburban  side  of  the  average  border  changed  as 
desegregation plans were implemented. My hypothesis is that βPLAN < 0, or that the price of city 
housing  declined  over  the  1970s  relative  to  its  neighboring  suburb  as  the  city  underwent  a 
process of school desegregation. 
For comparison, I estimate a corresponding equation for the portion of the sample in 
which the city did not undergo court-ordered desegregation (or both the city and suburb did) over 
the 1970s: 
ln(PRICE)isbt =  βNOPLAN(CITY x T) + S + T + (B x T) + εisbt             (2) 
While I do not have a strong prediction about the sign of βNOPLAN, the coefficient will be less 
than zero if other policy changes or events reduced the value of central city residence over the 
1970s. 
The full difference-in-differences specification combines data from the full set of borders, 
both those that received court-orders to desegregate and those that did not, and estimates: 
       ln(PRICE)ibst =  βD-D(ORDER x CITY x T) + γ(CITY x T) + S + T + (B x T) + εibst        (3) 
The variable of interest is now the interaction between location in a central city, receiving a 
court-order, and being in the post-desegregation era. A negative value  of βD-D indicates that 
housing prices fell over time in cities that experienced desegregation over the 1970s relative to 
their  suburban  neighbors,  as  compared  to  pairs  that  did  not  undergo  desegregation.  The 
interaction term (CITY x T) controls for general trends that may have reduced the demand for 
city residence over the 1970s.
7 
                                                 
7 Note that the other two double interactions – (ORDER x TIME) and (CITY x ORDER) – are subsumed by the 




The main threats to identification in this framework are other events or changes in local 
policies over the 1970s that may be correlated with the implementation of a desegregation plan. 
Given that relative city-suburban housing prices are measured at the border, we need only be 
concerned about factors that change discretely as one crosses from one jurisdiction to the next. 
Table 1 demonstrates that, already by 1970, urban districts that fell under court-order over the 
next decade were larger and had a higher black population share than other urban districts, while 
they are otherwise indistinguishable in terms of median income, poverty rate and the share of the 
population with a college degree.
8 Therefore, the most likely sources of bias are other changes 
that are associated with initial differences in city size and racial composition. For example, cities 
with a higher black population share were more likely to experience a race-related riot in the late 
1960s, which may have reduced relative housing prices in the central city over the 1970s (Collins 
and Margo, 2007). I show below that the estimates are robust to controlling for a measure of riot 
intensity. 
The generalizability of the price response to desegregation estimated at district borders 
depends on whether residents of border areas reflect the preferences of other city and suburban 
residents. Baum-Snow and Lutz (2008) show that households living near the city limits were 
more  likely  to  respond  to  desegregation  by  moving  to  the  suburbs,  while  centrally  located 
households were more likely to shift to private schooling. However, the fact that different sub-
populations relied on different adjustment mechanisms does not imply that one group was more 
accepting of integration than the other. Both of these responses would imply that the public 
                                                 
8  Differences  in  size  and  racial  composition  are  consistent  with  the  legal  strategy  of  groups  like  the  National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which targeted populous districts first in order to 




schools that were bundled with urban housing services lost value with school desegregation, a 
occurrence that would be reflected in urban housing prices. 
 
III. Data 
A. Block-level variables 
Estimating the effect of desegregation on housing prices requires a combination of data 
from multiple historical sources. I begin by using Census maps to identify pairs of neighboring 
city and suburban school districts for which block level data on housing values are available in 
the  Census  of  Housing  in  1970  and  1980.  To  increase  the  likelihood  that  housing  and 
neighborhood attributes are shared by units on either side of the border, I eliminate borders that 
are obstructed by a body of water, industrial land, or a four-lane highway. Furthermore, I restrict 
my attention to school districts with at least 10,000 residents to ensure the availability of the 
necessary demographic and socio-economic variables. Because Census blocks were not digitally 
mapped in 1970 or 1980, I code blocks by hand according to their distance from the border. This 
study focuses on blocks that are themselves adjacent to the school district boundary. 
The  dataset  contains  81  city-suburban  boundaries  in  29  northern  and  western 
metropolitan areas.
9 Table 2 lists the metropolitan areas in the dataset and the number of borders 
that each area contributes to the sample. The sample is evenly divided between the Northeast, the 
Midwest and the West but slightly over-represents large, fragmented metropolitan areas with 
populous suburbs. Los Angeles-Orange County, CA and New York City, NY-NJ, for example, 
                                                 
9 The number of district borders in the sample may seem small relative to the total number of such divisions in the 
typical urban area. The 15 metropolitan areas in the sample anchored by a large city (that is, one of the 50 largest 
cities in 1970) had an average of 10.5 borders, 6.7 of which had 10,000 or more residents and 4.9 of which were 
clear of any obvious obstruction. The average number of useable borders by metropolitan area in the sample is only 




together contain a quarter of the non-southern metropolitan population in 1970 while accounting 
for a third of the sample.
10 I omit southern districts for three reasons. First, much of the school 
desegregation activity in the South began in the 1960s, before the Census Bureau began sub-
dividing  suburban  areas  into  blocks.  Second,  many  southern  school  districts  cover  an  entire 
county, incorporating both a central city and its suburban neighbors. Finally, the requirement to 
desegregate was extended to many suburban school districts in the South.  
The block-level dataset contains information on housing prices and rents and a small set 
of housing quality measures from the Census of Housing. Due to confidentiality restrictions, the 
mean housing value (rent) is only available for blocks containing at least five owner-occupied 
(rental)  units.
11  Because  desegregation  may  also  affect  the  tenure  decision,  I  also  create  a 
measure of the average “user cost” of housing on the block. The user cost is calculated as a 
weighted average of the annual rent paid by renters and the borrowing cost paid by homeowners 
(= home value x interest rate).
12 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of these housing measures for the border sample. 
Blocks  on  either  side  of  the  city-suburban  border  have  typically  “suburban”  characteristics. 
Nearly  two-thirds  of  units  were  owner-occupied  and  residents  on  these  blocks  are 
disproportionately  white.  Although  eight  percent  of  the  residents  on  the  average  block  were 
black, over 80 percent  of the blocks in the sample had no black residents at all. The racial 
composition of sample blocks more closely resembles the average suburban district in the sample 
(5.5  percent  black)  than  the  average  city  (14.5  percent  black).  The  mean  value  of  owner-
                                                 
10 Many Ohio counties are unaccountably missing from the 1970 electronic block data. I limit coverage of Ohio to 
borders for which electronic data is available in 1970 and 1980. 
11 Housing values are based on owner self-reports. Kain and Quigley (1972) argue that owner reports are reliable. 
However,  self-reports  may  vary  across  district  borders  if  some  districts  assess  properties  more  regularly,  thus 
providing owners with updated information.  




occupied units was slightly over $100,000 (in 2000 dollars) on both sides of the border and mean 
monthly  rents  were  around  $550,  figures  that  fall  between  the  city  and  suburban  means. 
Although blocks on either side of the border are more similar to each other than they are to either 
the  typical  city  or  suburban  area,  there  are  still  discernable  differences  between  them.  In 
particular, housing values were 5.7 percent higher on the suburban side of the border in 1970; 
this difference is statistically significant.  
 
B. School district variables 
I collect data on the presence of desegregation court-orders by school district from the 
State  of  Public  School  Integration  website  (Logan,  2004).  The  site  contains  the  full  text  of 
judicial decisions and enumerates each action that a district was required to take to counteract 
desegregation. In the main specification, I measure the presence of a desegregation plan with a 
dummy variable equal to one if the court required the district to engage in at least one remedial 
step  (PLAN).  In  alternative  specifications,  I  also  consider  the  number  of  remedial  actions 
required by the court-order or the years elapsed since the case was decided. Actions include steps 
like redistricting school attendance areas, mandatory busing of students between schools, and the 
creation of magnet schools. While the median court-order required that the school district engage 
in two remedial steps, the number of steps ranges from one to ten.  
The treatment group is made up of the 29 borders in the sample that divide an urban 
district that faced a desegregation court-order in the 1970s from a suburban district that did not. 
The other 52 borders constitute the control group. Of these, 40 borders did not receive a court-
order to desegregate on either side before 1980, 7 borders contain districts were both required to 




Desegregation plans were intended to increase interracial contact in public schools. One 
measure of the efficacy of these plans is the exposure index, which measures the share of the 
student body at the average white student’s school that is black (or vice versa). The Office of 
Civil Rights collected school-level enrollment data by race for all school districts in 1970 and a 
sample of districts in 1980. The exposure index for district d is defined as: 
Ed = (Σs=1…n [wsd · bsd/tsd]) / Wd                   (4) 
where s indexes schools in the district. (bsd/tsd) measures the share of students at a given school 
who are black or the number of black students divided by the total number of students enrolled at 
that school. Ed calculates a weighted average of these black enrollment shares where the weights 
are the number of white students at the school (wsd) and Wd indicates the number of white 
students in the district as a whole. 
The effect of desegregation on exposure to black peers may vary substantially across 
households. Households living in school attendance areas whose local public school had a large 
black enrollment share before desegregation may experience little increase in exposure to black 
peers even with the implementation of a desegregation plan. In later specifications, I estimate 
heterogeneous effects of desegregation plans on housing prices according to the black enrollment 
share at the nearest high school in 1970. Without access to historical attendance area boundaries, 
I assume that students would have been assigned to their nearest public school (as the crow 
flies).
13 I employ GIS software and school addresses from the 1970 Elementary and Secondary 
General Information System (ELSEGIS) to match Census tracts to the nearest high school. The 
mapping procedure is outlined in the Data Appendix.  
                                                 
13  The  initial  black  enrollment  share  will  be  measured  with  error  if  school  boards  were  able  to  successfully 





This section estimates the effect of court-ordered school desegregation on the demand for 
urban residence by examining changes in the city-suburban housing price gap over the 1970s in 
metropolitan areas with and without a court-ordered desegregation plan. White households may 
have disliked school desegregation because of anxieties about mixed-race classrooms, concerns 
about  changes  in  peer  quality,  or  objections  to  sending  their  children  to  non-neighborhood 
schools. Because the block sample is disproportionately made up of white neighborhoods, the 
estimates will recover the willingness to pay to avoid school desegregation for the marginal 
white homeowner or renter. 
 
A. Desegregation and exposure to cross-race peers 
  Desegregation  court-orders  were  intended  to  increase  racial  balance  across  schools. 
Reber  (2005)  demonstrates  that  the  average  desegregation  plan  successfully  increased  white 
exposure to black peers and vice versa. I begin by replicating this finding in my sample to show 
that  the  court-orders  under  study  here  were  enforced  (at  least  to  some degree)  and  led  to  a 
measurable change in school policy. 
Table 4 compares changes in white exposure to black peers in urban districts that fell 
under court-order during the 1970s with districts that avoided court supervision. At the beginning 
of the decade, the black enrollment share at the average white student’s school was slightly lower 
but  not  statistically  different  in  districts  that  would  fall  under  court-order  (11.3  versus  12.6 
percent), despite the fact that treated districts had a higher initial black population share. Over 
the 1970s, average white exposure to black peers increased by 20 point in cities under court-




differences  estimator  indicates  that  this  14.5  point  difference  in  the  change  in  exposure  is 
statistically significant and is robust to controlling for changes in total population and the black 
population share over the 1970s.  
 
B. Desegregation and housing values 
Table 5 explores the effect of desegregation on the value of owner-occupied housing. 
Column 1 begins by considering metropolitan areas whose central city received a court order to 
desegregate during the 1970s. In 1970, the price for units on the city side of these borders was 
already 4.7 percent lower than their suburban neighbors. This initial gap in housing prices could 
reflect  pre-existing  disparities  in  school  quality  or  in  other  municipal  services,  like  police 
protection. The presence of initial differences in housing prices underscores the importance of 
being able to measure housing prices before and after the policy change.  
From 1970 to 1980, after the imposition of court-ordered desegregation, the housing price 
gap across these borders increased by 6.5 percentage points (equation 1). The declining relative 
value  of  city  housing  likely  reflects  an  aversion  to  school  desegregation.  This  conclusion  is 
bolstered by the fact, illustrated in the second column, that the premium for suburban housing 
remained steady, increasing by only 0.7 points at control borders over the 1970s (equation 2). 
The difference-in-differences estimator indicates that the suburban price premium increased by 
an additional 5.8 percentage points over the 1970s in metropolitan areas whose central city was 
required to desegregate (equation 3). 
The estimated decline in relative city housing prices may simply be a continuation of 
trends from prior decades. The 1960s was a period of troubled race relations, prefaced by two 




2007; Boustan, 2010). The final row of Table 5 examines changes in the city-suburban housing 
price gap across sample borders in the decade prior to the desegregation court-orders (1960 to 
1970). I limit my attention to the 56 borders for which block-level data is available in 1960. Over 
the 1960s, the city-suburban price gap expanded by 2 percentage points both in metropolitan 
areas that fell under court-order in the 1970s and those that did not. The difference between these 
two border types is negligible and not statistically significant. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
estimated change in housing prices is simply picking up long-run trends in urban demand. 
For comparison, Table 6 estimates the effect of court-orders on the district-wide median 
housing price for the 59 borders with available data in published Census volumes.
14 The value of 
owner-occupied housing in treated cities was already substantially lower than their suburban 
counterparts  in  1970  (18.5  percent).  Over  the  decade,  relative  city  prices  declined  by  an 
additional 10.5 percentage points in cities subject to court-ordered desegregation, compared to a 
much smaller 1.7 percent in cities that were not. Altogether, relative housing prices fell by 12 
percentage points more over the 1970s in cities that were subject to court-ordered desegregation.  
The  district-wide  estimate  of  the  willingness  to  pay  to  avoid  school  desegregation  is 
twice as large as the value obtained at the city-suburban border. The disparity in these estimates 
may reflect differential trends in housing quality in the urban core relative to areas proximate to 
the suburbs, which highlights the value of restricting the main analysis to blocks adjacent to the 
district border. Alternatively, this gap could reflect different preferences between residents of 
border areas and households in other parts of the metropolitan area. However, in this case, the 
comparison between Tables 5 and 6 would imply that residents on the city side of border areas 
                                                 
14 The coefficient from the 1970 to 1980 difference-in-difference regression is qualitatively similar when I restrict 
the sample to either the 56 borders with available block data in 1960 or to the 59 borders with available district-level 




were less averse to desegregation than was the typical city household; this pattern is unlikely to 
hold given that households in border areas already selected to be close to the suburbs, perhaps to 
avoid the heavily black neighborhoods in the urban core. 
 
C. Desegregation and other housing and neighborhood outcomes 
Table 7 examines the effect of desegregation on other neighborhood outcomes, including 
rents, the user cost of housing, measures of housing quality and characteristics of local residents. 
As before, I focus on the city-suburban gap in each outcome measured at the border. For brevity, 
I do not present the level differences across borders in 1970 or 1980. Instead, the first column of 
Table 7 reports the change in the city-suburban housing price gap over the 1970s in metropolitan 
areas whose central city faced a desegregation court-order (equivalent to equation 1), the second 
column presents this change for control areas (equation 2), and the third column compares the 
two values (equation 3). 
The monthly rent for rental units provides an additional measure of the market price of 
housing. However, the effect of desegregation on owner-occupied and rental housing may differ 
for two reasons. First, renters tend to be younger, less well-off, and less likely to have children, 
all of which may lead them to have different preferences for local public goods. In addition, 
housing  prices  incorporate  expectations  of  future  policy  change  between  city  and  suburban 
school districts, while rents capture a location’s value at a point in time. Given these factors, I 
find that desegregation had a slightly smaller effect on rents, although, given the standard errors, 
I cannot reject that the two estimates are the same. Over the 1970s, city rents fall by 6.6 percent 




much more modest across control borders, resulting in a difference in differences estimate of a 
4.0 percent decline in rents.  
Due to data restrictions, only a subset of sample blocks have available data on average 
rental rates (housing values). I calculate a measure of the user cost of housing for the full sample, 
which is essentially a block-level weighted average of annual rents for rental units and annual 
borrowing costs for owner-occupied units.
15 Row 2 shows that the presence of a desegregation 
plan is associated with a 7.1 percent reduction in the relative annual user costs of urban housing 
in treated cities. Desegregation reduced both housing values and rents. Perhaps as a result, I find 
little relationship between desegregation and owner-occupancy rates (row 3). 
As prices fell, desegregation may have affected the financial return to home renovations 
or maintenance. The only available measure of the quality of the housing stock is the number of 
rooms in the typical unit. In areas under court-order to desegregate, the number of rooms in 
suburban housing units increased by 0.12 of a room relative to the neighboring city (row 4). If all 
home  renovations  consist  of  adding  a  single  room,  the  difference-in-differences  estimate 
suggests that desegregation slowed the pace of renovation by 17 percent. 
Beyond changes to the housing stock, desegregation may have induced a re-sorting of the 
population at the local level, with households most opposed to the plan first to move out. White 
households may have been more opposed to desegregation than black households because of 
concerns about the effect of desegregation on peer quality. In addition, households with children 
may have been particularly averse to living in a desegregated school district. As a result, districts 
undergoing  desegregation  may  have  attracted  more  black  residents  and  households  without 
children than neighboring blocks in the suburbs over the 1970s. 
                                                 
15 Note that the coefficient on user costs is not itself a weighted average of the housing price and rental estimates 




Despite  the  potential  for  re-sorting  across  borders,  I  find  little  relationship  between 
desegregation  and  either  the  racial  composition  or  age  distribution  of  the  population  in  this 
sample. The fifth row of Table 7 shows that the presence of a desegregation plan is associated 
with a small and statistically insignificant increase in the probability of having a black neighbor. 
The final row of Table 7 estimates the effect of desegregation on the share of residents made up 
of school-aged children (5 to 17 years old). In both treatment and control areas, blocks on the 
city side of the border experienced small relative declines in the presence of school-aged children 
over the 1970s. Having a court-order did not lead to a differential decline in the size of the 
school-aged population at city borders.
16  
 
V. Alternative specifications 
Table  8  presents  a  series  of  robustness  checks  and  alternative  specifications  for  the 
relationship between school desegregation and housing prices. The table’s first row reproduces 
the baseline estimate, which finds that integration reduced housing prices by 5.8 percent. The 
second row addresses the main threat to identification, namely other changes to central cities 
over the 1970s that may have coincided with desegregation. Cities under court order were larger 
and had a higher black population than cities that escaped court supervision (Table 1). A natural 
candidate, then, for an omitted city-level variable is the incidence of race-related riot activity in 
the 1960s and early 1970s. I use a city-level index of riot intensity proposed by Collins and 
Margo (2007), which combines riot-related deaths, arrests, arsons and other forms of damage. 
                                                 
16 This pattern is consistent with Baum-Snow and Lutz’s (2008) finding that, outside the South, urban residents were 
more likely to respond to mandated school desegregation by shifting to private schooling rather than by leaving the 
central city. In this case, desegregation would not lead to out-migration from the city and resulting changes in 
household composition but would reduce the value of urban housing as the demand for the public schools bundled 




For this application, I set the riot index equal to zero in all cities in 1970, despite the fact that 
many riots occurred in the late 1960s, and assign the level of total riot activity over the period to 
1980. Reassuringly, I find no effect of riot activity on housing prices from 1970 to 1980, either 
because their consequences were already incorporated into housing prices by 1970, as Collins 
and Margo’s results would suggest, or because the epicenter of the violence was far from the 
suburban border. Most importantly for this context, adding a measure of riot activity has no 
effect on magnitude or precision of desegregation estimate. 
The third row of Table 8 augments the price regression with a control for the average 
number of rooms on the block. In this case, desegregation court-orders reduce housing prices by 
4.0 percent, implying that around 30 percent of the total relationship between desegregation and 
housing prices can be explained by changes in the underlying housing stock. Readers may prefer 
this value as the best hedonic estimate of the willingness to pay to avoid school integration given 
that it controls for other observed differences in housing quality. In the fourth row of Table 8, I 
drop the five borders that faced early desegregation plans from the control group. Doing so 
reduces the coefficient of interest to 4.9 percent, which remains significant at the 10 percent 
level.  The  results  are  qualitatively  unchanged  in  regressions  that  weight  each  block  or  each 
border equally (rows 5 and 6), rather than weighting by the number of owner-occupied units on 
the block.  
In the main specification, I group all desegregation court-orders into a single category 
and compare cities that faced a court-order in the 1970s to those that did not. In the seventh row, 
I instead count the number of required remedies contained in the court-order. Remedies include 
actions  like  rezoning  school  attendance  areas,  transferring  students  between  schools,  busing 




step reduced housing values by 1.9 percent. According to this estimate, a desegregation plan with 
the median number of steps (two) would lead to a 3.8 percent reduction in housing values, which 
is lower than the baseline estimate. This comparison suggests that the first step in a new plan had 
a larger effect on housing values than did incremental steps added to an existing plan. 
School districts may have phased in the reforms required by a court-order over a number 
of years. In this case, we may expect the effect of a desegregation plan on housing values to 
accumulate over time. On the other hand, as soon as a court-order is handed down, the intended 
policy changes can be anticipated by the public and, therefore, any effect on the demand for 
residence in the school district may occur immediately. The eighth row of Table 8 replaces the 
dummy variable for the presence of a desegregation plan with a continuous variable indicating 
the years since the court-order was handed down. Housing values decline by 1.3 percent for 
every year since the court order was issued. This coefficient implies that the 5.9 percent decline 
in housing values estimated is reached around five years after the plan is first announced.  
In the ninth row, I restrict my attention to blocks whose residents are at least 98 percent 
white. School desegregation has a larger negative effect on housing prices in this sub-sample (8.4 
percent). The final rows of Table 8 allow for a heterogeneous response to desegregation on the 
basis  of  the  initial  black  enrollment  share  at  the  nearest  high  school.  A  district-wide 
desegregation plan would have little effect on blocks that were already assigned to a racially 
integrated school. The ninth row interacts the indicator for the presence of a desegregation plan 
with  the  black  enrollment  share  in  the  nearest  high  school  in  1970.  Desegregation  reduces 
housing values by 13.2 percent in areas of the city that otherwise would have attended an all-
white high school (that is, the blocks for which the local high school had a black enrollment 




the estimated effect of desegregation on housing values declines. The coefficients suggest that 
desegregation would have had no effect on housing values in areas that were assigned to a high 




This  section  highlights  three  implications  of  the  relationship  between  school 
desegregation and urban housing prices. First, I argue that court-ordered desegregation reduced 
the  tax  base  of  central  cities,  imposing  a  fiscal  externality  on  city  residents.  Second,  by 
comparing my estimate with others from the literature, I show that the willingness to pay to 
avoid school desegregation can be  attributed both to concerns  about cross-race peers and to 
preferences for neighborhood schools. Finally, I argue that the housing price estimate suggests 
that the marginal northern homeowner was substantially less resistant to desegregation than was 
the median southern voter, in the sense that she would have needed less monetary compensation 
in order to accept racial desegregation in local schools. 
 
A. Tax revenue and fiscal externalities 
The  typical  desegregation  plan  reduced  housing  values  and  rents  in  an  urban  school 
district.  As  a  result,  desegregation  reduced  the  residential  tax  base  in  urban  school  districts 
relative to their neighboring suburbs. The average school district in the sample allocated $4,000 
per pupil in educational expenditures (in 2000 dollars) and relied on residential property taxes for 
                                                 
17 There is substantial variation in the black enrollment share at the nearest high school across borders (mean gap = 
15 pp; standard deviation = 23 pp). I find a similar effect on housing prices when I interact the presence of a 
desegregation order with the difference between the district-wide black enrollment share and enrollment at the local 
high school, a measure that provides a sense of how much the local school would have had to change in order to be 




75 percent of total revenue. Under various assumptions about the effect of desegregation on 
housing values in black neighborhoods, my estimates suggest that desegregation would have 
reduced  the  residential  tax  base  by  4.9  to  6.0  percent.
18  A  decline  of  this  magnitude  would 
translate into a $147 to $180 reduction in revenue per pupil assuming a constant property tax 
rate.
19  
The  full  effect  of  desegregation  on  available  resources  per  pupil  depends  on  the 
relationship between desegregation and both tax revenues and schooling costs. If desegregation 
required new expenditures, such as additional buses or higher teacher salaries, the estimated 
decline in available resources per pupil would understate the true decline. In contrast, if the 
policy change resulted in a net loss of student enrollments in urban schools, this value would be 
an overestimate. Furthermore, the research design in this paper can only identify changes in 
urban housing prices relative to neighboring suburbs. Therefore, while it is clear that school 
integration exacerbated inequities in school resources between cities and suburbs, we cannot 
conclude definitively that the urban tax base experienced an absolute decline.  
 
B. Cross-race peers and neighborhood schools 
The typical desegregation plan altered the mechanism by which students were assigned to 
schools. In order to comply with desegregation orders, school districts could no longer place all 
                                                 
18 The average decline in the residential tax base is a weighted average of changes in user costs in white and black 
neighborhoods. Given that residents on sample blocks are predominately white, I assume that my estimate indicates 
the change in housing prices in white neighborhoods. 84 percent of Census tracts in the median sample city were 
predominately  white  (defined  as  less  than  two  percent  black).  If  housing  values  were  unchanged  in  black 
neighborhoods following desegregation, the residential tax base would have declined by 6.0 percent (= 0.16 · 0.000 
+ 0.84 · -0.071). If, instead, housing values increased in black neighborhoods by as much as they declined in white 
neighborhoods, the residential tax base would have declined by 4.9 percent (= 0.16 · 0.071 + 0.84 · -0.071). This 
calculation uses the user cost of housing estimates from Table 8, row 2. 
19 Of course, cities were free to respond to this decline in the tax base by increasing the property tax rate, thereby 
holding constant the revenue collected per pupil. In that case, the cost of the unfunded mandate would have been 




students  in  the  nearest  school.  Rather,  many  white  students  were  reassigned  to  schools  in 
predominately black neighborhoods and vice versa. Comparing my results with estimates from 
the literature, I infer that objections to school desegregation were driven by more than just fears 
about cross-race classrooms or concerns about peer quality but also reflect an aversion to the 
assignment mechanism by which desegregation was achieved. 
Kane, Riegg and Staiger (2006) compare housing prices on either side of elementary 
school attendance area boundaries in Charlotte-Mecklenberg, NC, while controlling for distance 
to  school.  According  to  their  estimate,  the  increase  in  black  enrollment  associated  with  the 
typical  desegregation  plan  would  cause  housing  prices  to  decline  by  3.8  percent.
20  By  this 
measure,  two-thirds of the estimated housing price response to school desegregation can be 
attributed to concern about mixed-race classrooms and associated changes in peer quality (= 
3.8/5.9). The remainder of the estimated price response is likely due to concerns about school re-
assignment. Bogart and Cromwell find that assignment to a non-neighborhood school reduces 
housing prices by 7.5 percent. The residual change in housing prices would therefore imply that 
around 30 percent of sample households faced school re-assignment (= [5.9-3.8]/7.5), a value 
consistent with qualitative accounts of how desegregation was implemented.  
 
C. A revealed preference approach to the history of Civil Rights 
Existing histories of the Civil Rights era generalize about the popular response to school 
desegregation  on  the  basis  of  the  writings  and  actions  of  the  most  outspoken  members  of 
                                                 
20 Kane and co-authors estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in black enrollment share leads to a 2.6 percent 
decline in housing prices, suggesting that the 14.5 percentage point increase in black enrollment associated with the 
typical plan in my sample (Table 4, row 2) would lead to a 3.8 percent decline in housing prices. A related study is 
Clotfelter (1975), who compares housing prices across high school attendance areas following the desegregation of 





21  These  views  –  whether  of  angry  segregationists  who  gathered  to  block  the 
desegregation of Central High in Little Rock, AR or of crusading integrationists who marched in 
Selma, AL – may not be representative of the average resident. In contrast, this paper seeks to 
elicit typical attitudes toward school desegregation by studying the behavior of the marginal 
homeowner or renter.  
In  a  related  approach,  Cascio,  et  al.  (2010)  study  a  large  sample  of  southern  school 
districts. Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided federal funding 
for K-12 education nationwide. In order to be eligible for funding, school districts could not 
maintain segregated schools. The authors reason that, by accepting the offer of federal funding, 
school districts reveal the price at which their median voter was willing to forgo segregated 
schools.  To  be  in  compliance,  districts  needed  to  increase  the  black  enrollment  share  at  the 
average white student’s school by around four percentage points. Cascio, et al. estimate that the 
typical southern district was willing to engage in this amount of desegregation for $1000 per 
pupil per year of federal funding (in 2000 dollars). 
To compare my results with Cascio, et al., I convert housing prices into dollars per pupil. 
By my estimate, a four percentage point increase in black enrollment share is associated with a 
2.0 percent decline in the user cost of housing, or a $130 reduction in annual user costs for the 
average housing unit (=$6,508 · 0.020).
22 Converting this value into dollars per child yields an 
                                                 
21 A non-exhaustive list of the vast historical literature on responses to desegregation includes Carter, 1995; Gaston, 
1998; Webb, 2005; Sokol, 2006 and Crespino, 2009. 
22 The typical plan in my sample increased black enrollment share by 14.5 percent (Table 4) and reduced user costs 
by 7.1 percent (Table 8). By this estimate, the 4 percentage point increase in black enrollment share associated with 
Title I funding would lead user costs to fall by 2.0 percent. User costs is the most relevant metric for this calculation 




annual payment of $234 per child, around one-fourth of the federal payments required to induce 
the typical southern school district to begin the desegregation process.
23  
By this metric, the median southern voter appears to have been four times as resistant to 
school  desegregation  as  the  marginal  resident  in  the  North.
24  Despite  potential  differences 
between the median voter and the marginal resident as bellwethers of “average” tastes, it appears 
that the typical southerner was substantially more opposed to desegregation than was the typical 
northerner.  However,  this  gap  is  not  as  large  as  we  might  expect  based  on  the  case  study 
evidence alone.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
  The integration of public schools by race was one of the most important changes to the 
American educational system in the twentieth century. The Supreme Court first required school 
districts  to  address  the  de  facto  school  segregation  associated  with  historical  patterns  of 
residential location by race in the mid-1970s. The Court considered extending this obligation to 
predominately white suburban areas, but ultimately rejected this possibility in the 1974 Miliken 
v. Bradley decision. Therefore, outside of the South, court-ordered desegregation was applied 
only to central cities. 
As a result, the integration of public schools changed the value of urban residence in the 
North and West. Urban schools became more racially diverse and students were often reassigned 
                                                 
23 The average block had 45 housing units and 25 school-aged children (5-17 years old). 
24 This comparison could understate regional differences because northern desegregation plans often required school 
reassignment while southern plans did not. However, the comparison could also overstate the typical southerner’s 
distaste for integration for two reasons. First, residents most concerned about integration may have been most likely 
to vote in school board elections. Second, the Cascio, et al. paper generates variation in the size of federal grants by 
comparing rich and poor districts in states with greater and less school spending. Therefore, the marginal district that 
is indifferent about accepting the federal funding or not will be a rich district in an ungenerous state whose residents 




to non-neighborhood schools in order to achieve the necessary racial mix. I show in this paper 
that this process of school desegregation resulted in a decline in the demand for urban residence. 
Housing  prices  and  rents  in  cities  under  court-order  fell  by  six  percent  relative  to  their 
neighboring suburbs. The associated reduction in the urban tax base created a fiscal externality 
for remaining residents of central cities. 
Changes in housing prices reveal the marginal home owner’s willingness to pay to avoid 
school desegregation. This value converts the average disapproval of school desegregation into a 
dollar value that can then be compared to other programs, time periods, or regions. Cascio, et al., 
for instance, estimate that the typical southern district would have engaged in a token amount of 
desegregation for a payment of $1,200 per pupil. By this measure, northern residents appear to 
be  four  times  less  averse  to  desegregation  than  the  median  southern  voter.  Such  a  revealed 
preference-based measure contributes to our understanding of the history of school desegregation 







Pairing each Census block with the nearest high school proceeds in three steps: 
 
1. 1970 street addresses for schools in sample districts are obtained from the Elementary and 
Secondary General Information System (ELSEGIS). I identify academic high schools as those 
that  contain  grades  9-12  or  10-12  and  do  not  include  the  words  “manual,”  “technical”  or 
“vocational” in their name. Using GIS software, I locate these schools using the 2000 Census 
electronic road maps (http://www.esri.com/data/download/census2000_tigerline/). This process 
accurately geocoded over 90 percent of the schools in the sample. I checked the names and 
addresses  of  all  unmatched  schools  using  on-line  resources.  In  some  cases,  road  names  had 
changed from 1970 to 2000 and could be edited by hand; in others, schools appears to have 
closed in the intervening three decades. 
 
2. In a separate GIS layer, I map the centroid of Census tracts that contribute blocks to the 
sample. I then calculate the distance between Census tracts and high schools within the same 
district and select the high school with the minimum distance to be the assigned school for that 
area. 
 
3. The Office of Civil Rights collected data on the racial composition of enrolled students by 
school.  I match the OCR data with the ELSEGIS addresses using a cross-walk between the 
school identifiers. Districts with multiple tracts along one border area can match to more than 
one high school. In this cases, I assign the average racial composition of the two closest high 
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Table 1: Initial characteristics of urban school districts, 1970 
 
  Under order during 
1970s 
No order during 
1970s 
Difference 
ln (population)  13.172  12.071  1.100 
  (1.307)  (0.922)  (0.334) 
       
Share black  0.189  0.130  0.059 
  (0.127)  (0.136)  (0.043) 
       
ln(median income)  10.718  10.716  0.002 
  (0.139)  (0.132)  (0.043) 
       
Share poverty  0.093  0.085  0.009 
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.010) 
       
Share college degree  0.122  0.104  0.017 
  (0.093)  (0.056)  (0.022) 
Notes: The regressions compare the 13 cities that received a desegregation court-order during the 1970s to the 36 
cities that did not. Characteristics are measured in 1970. 




Table 2: School district borders with available block-level data by metropolitan area 
 
Notes: Metropolitan areas marked with 
† include secondary central cities that are now considered by the Census 
Bureau to anchor their own, independent metropolitan areas. These are: Newark, NJ; Jersey City, NJ; and Clifton, 
NJ (New York); Gary, IN (Chicago); Anaheim, CA (Los Angeles); and Oakland, CA (San Francisco). 
 
Region  Metropolitan area  Full sample  Number under 
court-order 
during 1970s 
Northeast  Allentown-Bethlehem, PA  2   
  Boston, MA  3  2 
  Hartford, CT  2   
  New York, NY-NJ
†  10  1 
  Pittsburgh, PA  2  2 
  Providence, RI  1   
  Scranton, PA  1   
  Springfield-Chicopee, MA  1  1 
Midwest  Akron, OH  2   
  Canton, OH  1   
  Chicago, IL
†  5   
  Cleveland, OH  2  2 
  Dayton, OH  1  1 
  Des Moines, IA  1   
  Detroit, MI  5  5 
  Grand Rapids, MI  3   
  Indianapolis, IN  1   
  Kansas City, KS-MO  4  2 
  Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN  2  2 
  Moline-Davenport, IL-IA  2   
  South Bend, IN  1   
  St. Louis, MO  1   
West  Denver, CO  2   
  Las Vegas, NV  1   
  Los Angeles, CA
†  17  8 
  Phoenix, AZ  1   
  San Bernard.-Riverside, CA  1   
  San Francisco, CA
†  3   
  San Jose, CA   3  2 
  TOTAL:  81  29 
 





Table 3: Summary statistics in border sample, 1970 
 
  Full sample  City  Suburb 
Average value, owner occupied  $107,083  104,079  110,125 
N = 2087/1050/1037  (40,725)  (37,580)  (43,487) 
       
Average rent  $549.40  544.16  554.79 
N = 1513/767/746  (166.60)  (156.34)  (176.48) 
       
Average user cost  $6,544.26  6,386.41  6,704.51 
N = 2646/1318/1320  (2248.74)  (2065.41)  (2411.23) 
       
Number units per block  45.046  46.371  43.721 
  (53.388)  (59.178)  (46.875) 
       
Number rooms in owned units  5.786  5.763  5.809 
  (0.861)  (0.829)  (0.891) 
       
Share owner occupied  0.629  0.625  0.633 
  (0.310)  (0.313)  (0.307) 
       
Share black  0.079  0.080  0.079 
  (0.221)  (0.222)  (0.219) 
       
Share pop, 0-4 yrs old  0.068  0.069  0.068 
  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
       
Share pop, 5-17 yrs old  0.213  0.211  0.215 
  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.101) 
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of block-level characteristics for Census 
blocks  adjacent  to  81  city-suburban  school  district  borders.  The  number  of  blocks  underlying  each  statistic  is 
reported in the left-hand column for the full sample, the city side of the border and the suburban side of the border 
respectively.  The  number  reported  for  user  costs  apply  to  the  rest  of  the  table  as  well.  Due  to  confidentiality 
restrictions,  mean  housing  values  (rents)  are  only  available  for  blocks  containing  at  least  five  owner-occupied 
(rental) units, while other characteristics are available for the full sample. All dollar values are reported in 2000 
dollars. User cost is a weighted average of annual rent for rental units and borrowing cost for homeowners (= home 





Table 4: School desegregation and white exposure to black peers 
 
Dependent variable = White exposure to black peers 
  Mean/standard deviation   
  Under court-order 
during 1970s 
Not under court order 
during 1970s 
Difference 
1970  0.113  0.126  -0.012 
  (0.067)  (0.114)   (0.034) 
       
1980  0.313  0.181  0.132 
  (0.206)  (0.119)  (0.053) 
       
∆ 1970-1980      0.145 
      (0.063) 
       
∆ 1970-80 with controls      0.135 
      (0.039) 
Notes: The sample includes city districts for which there is school-level data on racial composition in 1970 and 
1980. The regressions compare the 13 cities that received a desegregation court-order during the 1970s to the 24 
cities with available data that did not. The difference-in-differences specification in the fourth row controls for the 
black population share and logarithm of total population in the district. 
 





Table 5: School desegregation and relative city housing prices at the district border,  
1960-80 
 
Dependent variable = ln(housing value) 
  Under court-order 
during 1970s 
Not under order 
during 1970s 
Difference 
1970  -0.047  -0.026  -0.021 
  (0.014)   (0.015)  (0.020) 
       
1980  -0.097  -0.023  -0.073 
  (0.028)   (0.022)  (0.035) 
       
∆ 1970-1980  -0.065  -0.007  -0.058 
  (0.024)   (0.015)   (0.028) 
       
Pre-trend:       
∆ 1960-1970    -0.023  -0.022  -0.001 
   (0.013)   (0.017)   (0.022) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by school district. In rows 1 and 2, cells contain 
coefficients from regressions of block-level housing values on an indicator variable for being in the central city in a 
given decade (1970 or 1980). Row 3 reports coefficients for regressions of changes in housing prices from 1970 to 
1980 on the interaction between being in the central city and in the 1980 Census year (equations 1-3 in the text). 
Row 4 conducts the same regression for the previous decade (1960 to 1970). Note that the coefficients in row 3 are 
not equivalent to the difference between the coefficients in rows 1 and 2 because the regressions underlying row 3 
also include side of border fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by the number of owner-occupied units on the 
block. For rows 1 to 3, the sample includes Census blocks adjacent to 81 city-suburban school district borders in 
1970 and 1980. Data on housing values are only available for blocks containing at least five owner-occupied units. 
Regressions  in  row  3  contain  4386 observations,  2087  blocks  from  1970  and  2299  blocks  from  1980.  Row  4 
contains Census blocks adjacent to the 56 city-suburban borders with block-level data in 1960 (2495 observations, 
1010 blocks from 1960 and 1485 blocks from 1970). 
 
 





Table 6: School desegregation and relative city housing prices for the district as a whole 
 
Dependent variable = ln(median housing value) 
  Under court-order 
during 1970s 
Not under order 
during 1970s 
Difference 
1970  -0.185  -0.073  -0.112 
  (0.052)  (0.036)  (0.063) 
       
1980  -0.290  -0.090  -0.200 
  (0.072)  (0.050)  (0.086) 
       
∆ 1970-1980   -0.142  -0.022  -0.120 
  (0.044)  (0.020)  (0.040) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See the notes to Table 5 for details on the specification. The 
sample consists of school districts along the 59 borders for which housing price data is available in published 
Census volumes in 1970 and 1980. 





Table 7: The effect of desegregation on other housing and neighborhood outcomes 
 
 
  Court-order in 1970s 
∆ 1970-80 
No order in 1970s 
∆ 1970-80 
Difference 
Order vs. no order 
ln(rent)  -0.066  -0.027  -0.040 
  (0.024)  (0.021)   (0.030) 
       
ln(user cost)  -0.102  -0.030  -0.071 
   (0.025)   (0.021)   (0.031) 
       
Share owner occupied  -0.014  0.002  -0.017 
  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.023) 
       
Number of rooms  -0.115  0.050  -0.166 
  (0.076)  (0.056)  (0.094) 
       
Share black  0.020  0.003  0.017 
  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.021) 
       
Share 5-17 years old  -0.008  -0.008  0.000 
   (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by school district. The sample includes Census 
blocks adjacent to 81 city-suburban school district borders in 1970 and 1980. See notes to Table 5 for further details 





Table 8: Alternate specifications: Desegregation and housing values 
 
Dependent variable = ln(housing value) 
  Coefficient 
(1) Baseline effect  -0.058 
   (0.028) 
   
(2) Control for riot activity in city  -0.060 
   (0.028) 
   
(3) Control for number of rooms on block  -0.040 
  (0.026) 
   
(4) Drop borders with early plans (in 1960s)  -0.049 
   (0.028) 
   
(5) Weight each block equally  -0.058 
  (0.027) 
   
(6) Weight each border equally  -0.059 
  (0.029) 
   
(7) RHS = Number of steps in court-order  -0.019 
   (0.003) 
   
(8) RHS = Number of years since order passed  -0.013 
  (0.004) 
   
(9) Limit to blocks less than 2% black  -0.084 
  (0.027) 
   
(10) Interaction with local high school   
Court-order during 1970s  -0.132 
  (0.025) 
   
Order during 1970s x Black enroll share, 1970  0.336 
  (0.127) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by school district. The sample includes Census 
blocks adjacent to 81 city-suburban school district borders in 1970 and 1980. See notes to Table 5 for further details 
on the sample and regression specification. The Data Appendix explains how Census blocks were paired with their 
nearest high school in 1970. School-level racial composition data is from the Office of Civil Rights. 
 